CR2 Cession – security cession – surrender by cessionary.

CR2

  • Cession – security cession – surrender by cessionary.

Policies often serve as instruments of security for loans.  Microlenders insist on the cession of a policy, be it an existing one or a policy newly created for that very purpose, be it as security for the policyholder’s own debt or for the debt of another i.e. when the policyholder has been induced to stand surety for the debt of a family member.

Once that happens the policyholder is locked into a situation from which an escape is not always easy to engineer

Thos most we can do in such a situation is to explain the legal position to the complaining policyholder.  In one such case we said to the policyholder who had stood surety for the debt of his aunt, and ceded his policy to secure that debt:

“(i)       On such a security cession you retain your interest in the policy;

  • Once the debt in respect of which the cession has been given is extinguished the policy reverts to you;
  • Until that debt has however been repaid you cannot enforce your rights under the policy;
  • Since the cession was given as security for payment of the debt it follows that the cessionary is entitled to apply the proceeds of the policy to the payment of your debt;
  • Since your debt (as surety) is dependent on the non-payment by your aunt of her debt to the cessionary it follows that is he is in default the cessionary was entitled to a surrender of the policy which the insurer was obliged to implement.”

Where the policyholder challenges the validity of the cession or insists that the secured debt has in fact been repaid our ability to help is limited:  we can badger the insurer, as debtor, but we cannot engage the cessionary, as creditor.  We lack the jurisdiction to do so.  On that issue policyholders are on their own.

PMN

 

 

 

CR11 Disability claim repudiated on basis of failure to meet criteria of screening tests

CR11

• Disability claim – claim repudiated on basis of failure to meet criteria of screening tests – insured’s medical practitioners’ view that insured not capable of engaging in his occupation.

The complainant, a self-employed mechanic, was diagnosed as having a prothombotic tendency after suffering a deep vein thrombosis with severe pulmonary embolism, and a sagittal sinus thrombosis with cerebral venous infarcts and generalised seizures.

The view of the neurologist who treated him was that he no longer capable of engaging in his former occupation as a mechanic. Formal neuropsychological testing revealed deficits in executive functioning – he was unable to engage in abstract thought, and displayed perseveration and deficits in attention and working memory. In addition, the neurologist noted that he would have to take Warfarin, a blood-thinning drug, for life, and stated his view that “the combination of using Warfarin in a patient with seizures is fraught with difficulty, and then to additionally expose such a patient to a workshop environment with dangerous moving machinery and expect him to continue to work is an irresponsible and dangerous practice. “ It appears that the complainant would run the risk of severe bleeding if injured while on Warfarin, as a relatively minor laceration could result in hospitalisation.

The complainant had purchased a “new generation” disability product. A selling point for this product was that a lump sum disability benefit was payable not if an impairment affected one’s ability to perform a specific occupation, as in the classic disability benefit, but according to a system of strict medical criteria, described as “objective and fair”. Thus, when the complainant submitted his claim, it was assessed against the “nervous system” criteria. To qualify for a 50% benefit these criteria were: “inability to comprehend or communicate language symbols or 85% speech impairment or able to perform ≤ 4 basic activities of daily living or destruction of an optic nerve or monoplegia or < 20/125 Snellen rating bilaterally or > 75% binaural hearing impairment”. It seems the complainant did not meet any of these requirements – but the insurer repudiated the claim specifically on the basis that the neurologist had recorded a score of 5/6 on the Activities of Daily Living score sheet. In the last category, “Advanced activities”, he scored the complainant as “poor/cannot” in almost every sub-category, specifically memory, problem solving and stress adaptation.

The Ombudsman’s office commented that if one read the policy as a whole, it could not be interpreted as restrictively as the insurer had done. The wording in the policy was reminiscent of a classic disability policy.

The insurer recognises that some illnesses could be assessed only through strict screening tests. The policy stated that in cases where objective criteria were insufficient a more subjective test, the Activities of Daily Living score sheet, had to be used “to assess incapacity to work, for example, the inability to communicate, loss of memory, impaired locomotion, etc.” The score sheet tests activities in six basic activity categories: self care; communication; physical activity; sensory function; hand functions; and advanced functions.

We pointed out to the insurer that, in interpreting the contract to determine the common or constructive intention of the parties, and having regard to the contract as a whole, one needs to reconcile the policy provision that “this benefit pays a capital amount in the event of you being medically impaired and hence unable to work”, with an exclusion simply on the basis of medical screening tests that do not specifically measure an ability to work. The quoted statement indicated the nature and purpose of the contract: to provide cover if you were medically impaired and unable to work. The link between the criteria and the purpose was in fact explicitly acknowledged in the policy document: “these criteria are designed to establish whether your disability prevents you from working at all”. We suggested that the criteria should be seen, in the context of the contract as a whole, as guidelines to gauge whether an insured is able to work. They should not therefore be applied mechanistically but to help the insurer form an opinion as to the claimant’s ability to work, the insurer retaining a discretion to override the strict application of the criteria to give effect to the policy provision that the benefit is payable if you are “medically impaired and hence unable to work”, if indeed it is clear that the person cannot work.

The complainant’s case provided a good example of someone who was fully functional in most respects allowed for on the score sheet (5 out of the 6 categories), but who utterly failed the 6th category (Advanced Activities), which happened to contain most of the abilities one would immediately recognise as being necessary to enable one to work as a mechanic: social interaction, understanding concepts, memory, problem solving.

The insurer responded to our input by conceding that reliance solely on the Activities of Daily Living tool had led to an unfair result. It agreed to pay the 50% benefit immediately and indicated that it would consider payment of the remaining 50% after the complainant had had a further neuropsychological assessment to determine whether his cognitive impairment was moderate or severe. We accepted the reasonableness of this stance.

SM

CR12 Disability claim – “own, similar or other occupation”

CR12

Disability claim – “own, similar or other occupation” – whether the complainant is suited for the alternative occupations the insurer maintains he is able to perform.

The complainant worked as a caretaker of community halls for a municipality. He had chronic bilateral osteoarthritis of the knee joints and had had total knee replacements. His services were terminated on grounds of incapacity and he submitted a claim for a disability benefit.

The definition of disability in the policy reads:

“The Company shall regard a Member as having become Disabled if…due to an injury, illness or a disease, he is totally and permanently prevented from following his own occupation, and a similar or other occupation for which he is suited having regard to his ability, training, education and experience.”

The insurer did not in dispute that the complainant could not perform his own occupation as a caretaker, which was a physically demanding job involving walking, bending to clean floors, lifting and carrying chairs, pushing a trolley, etc. However, the insurer maintained that he would be able to perform the duties of a clerk (he had worked as an office clerk before for a short period many years ago).

An examination of the complainant’s occupational history and current status, as set out in the occupational therapist’s report, indicated that, of his 27 years spent working, some 21 had been spent doing physical work: 3 years as a petrol attendant, 3 years installing electrical poles, 1 year as a packer and 14 years as a caretaker. Approximately 6 years were spent working as an office clerk, a number of years earlier (1978 – 1983), in our view making any skills he gained during that time out of date or forgotten to some degree. It appeared likely that he did not have a great aptitude for work as an office clerk, as his subsequent jobs, for the next 18 years, were manual jobs. His abilities and experience thus lay overwhelmingly in physical manual work. He had a relatively low level of education (Std 8) and no other training whatsoever. Our stated view was that in all the circumstances it was not reasonable to regard the complainant as suited for a clerical occupation.

The insurer objected to our preliminary view, stating that the fact that the bulk of the claimant’s work was manual was irrelevant, and reiterating that he had six years as an office clerk which would certainly be classed as experience.

We made a final ruling however that it was not reasonable to regard the complainant as suited for the clerical occupations mentioned. In the ruling we quoted from the LOA booklet “Impairment and Disability Assessment Guidelines” as follows:
“Factors which influence the reasonability of an alternative/similar occupation, include:

Years in current position. The lower one’s qualifications, and the longer one is in one specific occupation, the less reasonable will any alternative position become. In this regard it is recommended that it should be unfair to expect the following categories to do any alternative work, ie own/similar definitions should effectively become own occupation:
* Any manual labourer with qualifications less than Grade 12 at school, and doing a manual work for > 10 years”.

SM

CR13 Disability claim – total permanent disability

CR13

Disability claim – total permanent disability – elements of definition – interpretation of word “suited” in definition

The complainant, a bus driver, suffered a gunshot wound. As a result his left leg was amputated above the knee, and he now wears a prosthesis. He was dismissed from his employment on grounds of incapacity, and has not worked since. He had cover in terms of a group insurance scheme arranged by the company which gave him a housing loan.

The definition of disability in the policy is as follows:

“A life assured shall be regarded as totally and permanently disabled if in the opinion of the insurer, he has been so disabled by injury or illness as to be continuously, permanently and totally incapable of engaging for remuneration or profit (a) in his own occupation, or (b) in any other suited occupation for which he is or could reasonably be expected to become qualified by his knowledge, training, education, ability and experience.”.

An Occupational Therapist (“OT”) who assessed the complainant reported a number of ongoing physical limitations and pain, and stated her opinion that he was totally and permanently compromised for his occupation as a bus driver. However she was of the view that he had the potential for retraining for semi-skilled, sedentary occupations to which he would be suited, such as machine operator.

The insurer pointed out that the housing loan company which arranged the group insurance had selected cheaper cover with a stricter than usual definition of disability. The insurer accepted that the complainant could not perform his own occupation as a bus driver. However it applied criteria in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles and concluded that there were many types of “light work” machine operator jobs (28 examples were listed) for which, with reference to the definition wording, it could reasonably be expected that the complainant could become qualified. It could also reasonably be expected that he develop the necessary physical capacity through a vocational rehabilitation programme. He had even done some machine operator work for a period before, in the early 1980’s. The insurer maintained that on the evidence he was not permanently incapable of performing an alternative occupation, and rejected the claim.

The Ombudsman’s office took the view that “any other suited occupation” must be interpreted to refer to an occupation in which a person of the insured’s level of knowledge, training, education, ability and experience could engage, but which a person of lesser knowledge, training, education, ability and experience would not be able to follow – in other words it is not referring to an occupation at a lower level. It would be unreasonable to hold that the insured fell outside the requirements of the definition, on the grounds that he was capable of engaging in some job at a lower level than the job he previously held.

The complainant’s work history, as outlined in the OT report, indicated that over the 22 years of his working life he had gradually bettered himself and his prospects. Starting out as a handyman, he later became a machine operator, which would have involved some specific training. Thereafter he left for “better prospects” to become a truck driver; this would have involved the training needed to obtain a specific licence. After five years he obtained a bus driver’s job, which came with improved benefits, and he gained experience and salary increases by working in this position for eight years. To expect the complainant to work as a machine operator at this stage, or to start out in some other form of semi-skilled sedentary work, would be to expect him to work at a lower level than at the time of his disablement, in an occupation which cannot be seen as another suited occupation.

The definition also envisages the possibility of further training: to be considered disabled, the insured must be incapable of engaging in any other suited occupation for which he could reasonably be expected to become qualified. However this must imply that any further training would be towards the end of qualifying him for a job at the same level as the one he is incapable of performing (“own occupation”), or a higher level, but not a lower level.

The amputation of the complainant’s leg above the knee had left him considerably impaired, with a reduced range of movement, pain, muscle weakness, poor dynamic balance, reduced physical and mental stamina and an inability to tolerate prolonged sitting without discomfort. He could not drive, or even use public transport without the help of an attendant. His level of education was not high (standard 7) and his literacy and numeracy skills were average or below average. All these factors would strongly indicate that the complainant was not able to perform his own or any other suited occupation, nor could he reasonably be expected to become qualified for a suited occupation, taking into account his knowledge, training, education, ability and experience.

It did not seem on a balance of probabilities that the complainant was capable of working full-time in light physical work. In any event whether he could perform any alternative occupation was not the test engendered by the definition; the insured should be regarded as totally and permanently disabled if he could not do his own or any suited occupation, at the same level. The Ombudsman’s office made a provisional ruling that the claim should be admitted and paid, and the insurer thereafter admitted the claim.

SM

CR14 Disability claim – insurer being pedantic

CR14

• Disability claim – insurer being pedantic

Background

Mrs A enjoyed an Income Protection Benefit from Company X. She was booked off from work for back problems. According to her general practitioner she should rest for 3 weeks and go for physiotherapy and biokinetic exercises. Two days later she instituted a claim but was informed that the claim was repudiated because she was not booked off by a specialist. She complained about this and Company X undertook to re-assess the claim. In the end it repudiated the claim because she did not go to a physiotherapist.

According to Mrs A, her doctor had advised her to rest and take medication, and only if that did not help, should she go for physiotherapy. When the three weeks expired she did go to a physiotherapist.

When we wrote to Company X it responded that the doctor’s instruction was not carried out. It also do no accept that a general practitioner could diagnose a serious back condition without referring the insured to a specialist. It relied on a clause in the contract which stated that “professional medical advice shall be sought and followed promptly on the occurrence of any bodily injury or illness and the company shall not be liable for that part of any claim which in the opinion of its medical advisor arises from the unreasonable or wilful neglect or failure of any insured person to seek and remain compliant under the care of a qualified medical practitioner”.

Assessment

We did not agree with Company X that Mrs A did not carry out the doctor’s instruction or that the doctor’s advice could be interpreted that she should immediately go for physiotherapy. We also did not agree that the abovementioned clause could be interpreted that she should consult with a specialist before a valid claim could be instituted.

Result

Company X decided to pay the benefit.

AS

CR15 Disability – suitable alternative occupation

CR15

Disability – suitable alternative occupation

Facts

The insured in this case was a saleslady in the fresh produce department of a small supermarket. She started suffering from repeated hernia complaints for which she had six repairs during a period of five years. As a result her employer “boarded” her after they had attempted to redeploy her to delicatessen department. Here she was still required to lift packages and she became acutely ill and the employer thereupon terminated her employment. The employer also indicated that the insured was unable to stand for extended periods and presented with excessive abdominal and lower limb swelling by the end of the working day. When she submitted a disability claim to the insurer the insurer declined the claim on the basis that although the complainant could no longer fulfil her previous occupation she could work as a saleslady in the fresh produce department of a different kind of supermarket or she could work as a cashier.

The complainant was 46 years old and had a standard seven education and had worked as a saleslady in the fresh produce department since commencing employment. In the light of her physical disabilities we requested the insurer to re-evaluate the complaint. The definition of total and permanent disability which applied to her policy read as follows: “the normal occupation in which the life assured was gainfully employed at the time of disablement or any other occupation for gain or reward to which the life assured would be reasonably suited by education, training, earnings, status or experience.”

Discussion

We were of the opinion that the alternative occupation for which the complainant would be able to qualify would require extensive accommodation by an employer to such an extent that we were not convinced that such occupations existed in reality. As she was unable to lift objects, unable to stand for extended periods and according to her previous employer did not have the intellectual capacity to work as a cashier that left a very limited number of occupations available to her. We were not convinced that these fell within the purview of the definition. A claims consultant from a reinsurer re-evaluated the claim and submitted that it was unlikely that any new potential employer would willingly tailor-make a position to suit the complainant and conceded that it would be unreasonable to decline the claim on the basis that the complainant could carry on an alternative occupation. The insurer accordingly paid the claim.

JP

CR16 Exclusions – fishing for information to support an exclusion

CR16

• Exclusions – fishing for information to support an exclusion

Background

Mr A enjoyed life cover under his policy with Company X. When he died (due to natural causes), his wife instituted a death claim and provided Company X with all the necessary documents to prove it. Company X requested further medical information from her and when she failed to provide it, informed the executors of Mr A’s estate that until the outstanding information was received it could not assess the claim.

According to Company X it is common practice to obtain further medical records in the event of natural death. Medical records were requested from the hospital where Mr A had died in order to investigate the circumstances surrounding his death. Upon receipt of the records Company X noticed that it was incomplete and therefore endeavoured, but failed, to obtain a full set of copies of the medical records from the hospital.

Assessment

Because Mr A’s wife had already provided Company X with all the documents to prove the death claim it appeared to us that it required the additional medical records to rely on an exclusion clause (possibly a pre-existing condition). We informed Company X that if it wanted to rely on an exclusion clause, it had to prove its reliance and that it could not expect the claimant to provide them with such proof. We informed Company X that it was not allowed to delay payment of the claim because it was experiencing difficulties in obtaining the still outstanding medical information required in order to rely on an exclusion clause.

Result

The complaint was upheld.

AS

CR17 Delay – exclusions – late submission of claim

CR17

• Delay – exclusions – late submission of claim – is the insurer entitled to rely on the exclusion clause?

Mr A suffered a stroke on 29.07.2002. His doctor suggested that he wait “close to a year and only than (sic) it would be possible for him to say if damage is permanent or temporary.” He approached his brokers during mid July 2003, but they were no longer representing the insurer. He alleged that nobody informed him that the brokerage had changed.

On 15.07.2003 (before the expiry of 365 days) he wrote directly to the insurer, requesting claim forms. He received no response and approached another broker for assistance. Only after the intervention of this broker, did Mr A find out who the new brokers were that dealt with these policies.

His second letter was sent via registered mail and reached the insurer. However, the claim was declined due to late submission. Their decision was based on the following wording in their contract:

“notice must be given to Us in writing within 365 days of any occurrence which may give rise to a claim under this Policy.

All certificates, information and evidence required by Us shall be furnished in the form prescribed and without expense to Us and must be submitted to Us within 365 days following notification. After 365 days the onus shall rest with the claimant to prove that We were not prejudiced in any way as a result of the late notification.”

We requested details regarding the prejudice that the insurer may have suffered as a result of the late submission of the claim. The insurer informed us that the renewal date of the scheme was on 01.04.2003 and that “renewal terms are negotiated according to the loss ratio.” We concluded that the 365 day period in which Mr A had to notify the insurer of the claim only ended on 28.07.2003, so the renewal terms would not have been a factor, as he could still have submitted his claim after the renewal date of 01.04.2003. We also took into consideration that Mr A wrote to the insurer on 15.07.2003 regarding this matter, but it appears as if the letter got lost in the mail.

We suggested to the insurer that it should meet the claim, which it did.

HE

CR19 Funeral Insurance – non-renewal of policy under dubious circumstances.

CR19

• Funeral Insurance – non-renewal of policy under dubious circumstances.

In a recent case a complaint, commencing as one about the cancellation of two policies, in time developed a completely different momentum. The complainant took out two funeral policies, the one in 1998 in respect of her brother and the other in February 1999 in respect of her niece. The policies were five-year term policies. The policy document in each case provided that the basic term was a five-year period with the option to the policyholder, within 3 months before or after the renewal date (being the date on which the basic term would end), to renew cover for another basic term provided that a new application form was completed. In addition waiting periods and limitations on cover due to natural causes would once again apply.

The complainant duly paid, and continued to pay, the premiums in respect of both policies even though both policies expired at the appointed time, the one in 2003 and the other in February 2004, without application having been made for their renewal.

The insurer thereupon issued cheques for the refund of the over-payment of premiums.

On 30 September 2004, long after both policies had expired, the complainant complained about their cancellations and in particular that neither she nor the lives assured were informed of the imminent expiry of the policies. She also complained about the amounts of the repayments. She asked that each policy should be renewed as from the previous expiry date, that is to say, in the case of her niece in particular, from 1 March 2004.

The insurer responded that in the light of the explicit policy wording it was under no duty to caution the lives assured or indeed the complainant to renew their cover prior to the contractual expiry date.

The insurer was, however prepared to “provide you with the opportunity to renew these benefits” and to “waive the relevant waiting periods.”

The complainant wrote back on 20 October 2004 to confirm that, inter alia, her niece’s policy was to be renewed, albeit at higher rates, as from 1 March 2004. She asked for the necessary application form to be forwarded to her. She also returned the two refund cheques and tendered payment of the amounts due on both policies, once renewed.

On 29 October 2004 she wrote to this office complaining that the insurer, contrary to her urgent request and its promise to her to do so, had failed to send an agent to her home with the required application forms.

It was only thereafter that it transpired that her niece had actually passed away the next day, 30 October 2004, from natural causes.

The complainant thereupon claimed payment on the policy in respect of the death of her niece. The insurer responded, “Prior to this information coming to light we were still prepared to have the Application Form completed. However, under the circumstances, signing an Application Form for an Assured Life that is no longer alive would prove futile.

In our view the client was well aware of the assured life’s medical condition, hence her persistence for someone to come to see her on 29 October 2004. She mentioned on several occasions that the matter could not be delayed. If indeed the client was not satisfied with this arrangement and was not prepared to delay the matter any longer, the responsibility to approach any in-house adviser rested with her. Also, from a contractual point of view, we were not obligated to make any claim payment since the Application Form was never completed.”

The insurer’s approach was, in our view, entirely correct. The completion of an application form in respect of her niece was clearly a prerequisite for the issue of a new policy. The problem that may well have arisen if an application form had been completed on 29 October 2004, with or without a full disclosure of the niece’s then medical condition, accordingly did not eventuate. The complainant failed to inform us whether she wanted the insurance in respect of her brother to be continued. In the circumstances our file was closed.

PMN

CR3 Cession – security cession – fraudulent surrender of policy.

CR3

  • Cession – security cession – fraudulent surrender of policy.

A policyholder, Mr A, ceded his policy to Mr B as collateral security for the payment of a debt owing to the latter.  He stated that his broker, Mr C, “during November 2002 was reviewing my portfolio and I agreed that he uplift this policy from” Mr B, the cessionary.  Mr C persuaded Mr B to sign a blank document which he fraudulently completed as an outright cession to himself.  Acting on this cession he persuaded the insurer to surrender the policy.  The proceeds of the policy were paid into the bank account of Mr C’s minor son.

When the above facts were revealed the complainant complained to the office.  This led to further investigations when the insurer discovered and confirmed the fraud.  The insurer offered the policyholder the choice of either reinstating the policy against payment of arrear premiums or accepting the cash value of the policy with interest.

The policyholder elected the latter.

It is arguable that even in the absence of proof of  fraud the insurer might have been liable to the policyholder in any event as the first cession was clearly stated to be a security cession.  There is much to be said for the view that there is a duty on an insurer, if perhaps not in strict law then in fairness, to inform the cedent of the fact that a claim had been made on the policy by the cessionary or another third party to enable the latter to protect his rights by challenging the proposed payment.

PMN