CR186 Health insurance – interpretation – “expenses reasonably and necessarily incurred”.

CR186

Health insurance – interpretation – “expenses reasonably and necessarily incurred”.

Agtergrond

Die klaer was die houer van ‘n gesondheidspolis wat voorsiening gemaak het vir die betaling van mediese uitgawes. Daarby was ingesluit “reiskoste wat redelikerwys en noodsaaklikerwys” (“expenses reasonably and necessarily incurred”) in verband met die mediese uitgawes (soos omskryf) ten opsigte van verblyf in ‘n hospitaal vir minstens ‘n dag aangegaan is. Die vraag was of die koste van ‘n vlug van Klaserie na Grand Central lughawe (R3479) “redelikerwys en noodsaaklikerwys” deur die klaer aangegaan was; dan wel of hy hoogstens op die koste van ‘n rit per ambulans van Klaserie na Nelspruit (R2331) geregtig was.

Die klaer wat in Johannesburg gewoon het, is tydens ‘n besoek aan Klaserie in die laeveld in ‘n ongeluk beseer. Hy is per motor na die militêre hospitaal te Hoedspruit vervoer waar hy geadviseer was om ‘n ortopedis te raadpleeg. Vier dae later het die klaer op eie koste ‘n vliegtuig gehuur om hom van Klaserie na Grand Central te vervoer.

Toe hy ‘n eis vir betaling van die bedrag by die versekeraar aanhangig gemaak het, het die versekeraar aanvanklik geantwoord dat hy hoogstens op die mindere koste van ‘n rit per ambulans van Klaserie na Nelspruit geregtig was waar die nodige medies behandeling beskikbaar was.

Die klaer het toe by ons beswaar gemaak. Sy argument was dat “redelikerwys” ‘n ruimer begrip as “noodsaaklikerwys” is en dat daar gevolglik aan die wyer begrip gevolg gegee moes word; as die uitgawe “noodsaaklik” is, is dit moeilik om mens in te dink dat nie ook “redelikerwys” aangegaan sou gewees het nie. Omgekeerd, ‘n uitgawe kan in gegewe omstandighede “redelik” wees (‘n rit per ambulans) sonder dat dit streng gesproke “noodsaaklik” was (‘n rit per motor sou ook deug).

Die probleem met dié vertolking is dat daar dan geen betekenis aan die woord “noodsaaklikerwys” geheg word terwyl die algemene reël juis is dat woorde in ‘n kontrak slegs uitsonderlik buite rekening gelaat kan word.

Ons vertolking was dat daar eerder aan albei komponente gewig geheg moes word in die sin dat die aangaan van die koste noodsaaklik en die omvang daarvan redelik moes wees.

Redelikheid is ‘n objektiewe norm. Dit gaan dus nie oor wat vir ‘n besondere persoon, gegewe sy persoonlike voorkeure, redelik mag voorkom nie maar wat ‘n objektiewe buitestaander, alles in ag genome, as redelik sou beskou.

So gesien, was dit na ons mening noodsaaklik dat die klaer vervoer moes word om by ‘n ortopedis uit te kom; maar was dit nie redelik dat hy teen heelwat groter koste van Klaserie na Grand Central moes vlieg terwyl dieselfde mediese deskundigheid in Nelspruit vir hom beskikbaar was nie.

As algemene uitgangspunt slaan die redelikheid van ‘n bedrag op dit wat op die mees ekonomiese wyse behaal kan word – en dit sou ‘n ambulansrit na Nelspruit wees wat uiteraard goedkoper was as ‘n vliegrit na Grand Central. Anders as wat die klaer betoog het, was spoedeisendheid nie ‘n deurslaggewende faktor nie want die rit is in ieder geval eers ‘n paar dae na die ongeluk onderneem; en die slegte pad van Klaserie na Nelspruit kon ook nie as sodanig deurslaggewend beskou word nie aangesien die klaer reeds ‘n rit van Klaserie na Hoedspruit en terug onderneem het, vermoedelik per motor. Die verdere oorweging dat die klaer en sy eggenote so na as moontlik aan sy woonadres wou wees wanneer hy behandeling ontvang, was ‘n saak van persoonlike gerief wat as sodanig ook nie deurslaggewend kon wees nie.

Resultaat

Ons voorlopige bevinding was gevolglik dat die klagte nie gehandhaaf kon word nie en dat die klaer hoogstens op die koste van die ambulansrit geregtig was. Maar na verdere vertoë wat deur die klaer gerig was oor wat hy as “redelik” beskou het, het die versekeraar goedgunstiglik ingestem om tog maar die verskil van R1148 te betaal en op dié wyse is die saak toe uiteindelik suksesvol besleg.

PMN
November 2006

CR143 Health Insurance – repudiation of claim on grounds of non-disclosure

CR143

Health Insurance – repudiation of claim on grounds of non-disclosure. Should the insured have disclosed a history of an eye problem particularly taking cognisance of the fact that a specific question featured in the application form?

Background

The contract is a health insurance policy catering for hospitalisation benefits and major medical expenses. A question in the application form reads, ”… Have you ever suffered from or been treated for any of the following: growth, tumour, cancer or any physical impairment or injury of any ear, eye, nose, throat or skin disorder?”. This was answered negatively.

Six months prior to completing the application form the complainant had in fact consulted an ophthalmologist and at that time posterior vitreous detachment was diagnosed and treated. Two months after the policy was effected the policyholder submitted a claim for the surgical repair of a detached retina. The insurer denied liability stating that if the history of posterior vitreous detachment had been revealed at the application stage the policy would have been issued subject to an exclusion of any disease or disorder of the eye. This decision was challenged and the complaint to the Ombudsman’s Office was in fact submitted, not by the policyholder, but by the ophthalmologist involved who expressed, in very strong terms indeed, that this was an unfair decision.

Discussion

The test for materiality of non-disclosure is whether a reasonable prudent person would have regarded the information which was not disclosed as being material. The insurer’s Chief Medical Officer stated that in cases of posterior vitreous detachment there is an increased risk of subsequent retinal detachment. We sought specialist advice and the ophthalmologists whom we consulted disagreed with this view. One expressed the opinion that posterior vitreous detachment is a trivial complaint which normally requires no action on the part of the ophthalmologist. A second opinion from another ophthalmologist described posterior vitreous detachment as harmless, a condition which would not normally require any treatment.

It was our view that the information that was not disclosed was not material. The fact that the complainant was informed by his ophthalmologist that posterior vitreous detachment was “a normal occurrence” was also taken into account.

Result

The complaint was upheld and the insurer’s original decision to deny liability was reversed.

DM
April 2006